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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether managers can reduce the detrimental effects of information overload 
by spreading out, or temporally smoothing, disclosures. In our initial set of analyses, we attempt to 
identify managerial smoothing behavior. We find that when there are multiple disclosures for the 
same event date, managers, on average, spread the disclosures out over several days. We also find 
that managers are more likely to delay a disclosure (from its event date) when there has been a 
previous disclosure made within the three days before the event date. Finally, we show that 
managers are more likely to engage in disclosure smoothing when disclosures are longer, when the 
information environment is more robust, when firm information is complex, when uncertainty is 
high, and when disclosure news is more positive. In our second set of analyses, we examine 
whether there are market benefits to disclosure smoothing. Using two different measures of 
disclosure smoothing, we find that smoothing is associated with increased liquidity, reduced stock 
price volatility and increased analyst forecast accuracy. Finally, in additional analyses, we show 
that managers are less likely to engage in smoothing when they have negative news; they also 
release good news more quickly after bad news. Combined, our results suggest managers smooth 
disclosures and the smoothing is associated with several beneficial market outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
Efficient capital markets rely on disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and facilitate trade 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Beyer et al., 2010; Shroff et al., 2013). Accordingly, since the 1930s, 
regulators have progressively expanded mandatory disclosure rules to increase both the frequency 
and length of firm disclosures (Paredes, 2003). At the same time, there has been a significant 
increase in firms’ voluntary disclosure, as investors demand more and more timely information 
and firms attempt to further combat adverse selection. However, the volume of disclosure has 
reached the point that regulators and practitioners are expressing concern that the market is 
overloaded with information, which is reducing its ability to adequately process firm disclosures 
(Radin, 2007; White, 2013; Higgins, 2014).  
Exacerbating this issue is the fact that firm disclosures typically trigger a significant number of 
media articles in the days immediately after a firm disclosure (Drake et al., 2017). In particular, both 
traditional news outlets (e.g., newspapers, financial publications and news shows) and, 
increasingly, technology-enabled intermediaries (e.g., investor websites, blogs and social media) 
provide additional disclosure regarding a firm as they analyze, summarize and interpret firm news, 
contributing further to information overload around firm-initiated disclosures. 
Despite the large increase in disclosure over the years, information users’ time horizon to 
process information has not increased, and in fact is arguably shrinking. In particular, investors 
have incentives to make trading decisions more and more quickly in order to preserve an 
information advantage. Similarly, analysts are under significant pressure to provide insights and 
reports while the firm news is still ‘fresh’ and clients can act quickly. Thus, market participants 
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often have to process increasingly large amounts of information in shorter periods of time, and 
therefore must make decisions without fully processing the information.1  
In this paper, we examine whether managers can combat information overload by spreading 
out, or temporally smoothing, firm disclosures.2  We argue that managers can smooth disclosures 
out to reduce the amount of information being disclosed in a short period of time (as compared to providing 
multiple disclosures at one time), which allows the market to more fully process each disclosure 
along with any related information produced by intermediaries. 3  Investors typically need 
additional time to devote to a disclosure because full assimilation of new information requires 
much more than simply reading the disclosure. It often involves additional due diligence including 
computational analyses, competitor related analyses, disclosure synthetization with other pieces of 
information (e.g., other firm disclosures and/or peer firm disclosures), and discussions with various 
firm stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, other investors) or even firm management in order to 
fully understand the implications of the disclosure (Brown et al., 2015, 2018; Soltes, 2014; Chapman, 
Miller and White, 2018).4  
                                                   
1 It is important to note that our theory, and corresponding predictions, are based on fundamental traders, i.e., those 
traders that read firm disclosures and incorporate that information into their trades. Traders conducting technical 
analysis do not process firm disclosures, and thus do not require time to read firm disclosures.  
2 In Section 3, we discuss our two disclosure smoothing proxies, measured over a quarter: (1) the number of disclosures 
made in short (less than 3-day) intervals, and (2) the standard deviation of the time between firm disclosures. Figure 1 
provides examples of low, moderate and high disclosure smoothing using both proxies.  
3 Managers can also mitigate overload by reducing disclosure. However, mandatory reporting requirements make this 
option less viable, and reduced disclosure arguably could make the information environment even worse. In contrast, 
smoothing allows the same amount of information to be disclosed. By spreading out the timing of the disclosures, 
managers give investors less information to process over any short period of time.  
4 For example, consider disclosures about a new product or a corporate acquisition. Stakeholders cannot simply read 
these disclosures and understand the implications of this information for firm value. For product announcements, 
investors would want to better understand the technology behind the product, associated costs and revenues, 
adjustments to the product mix, impact on competitors, consumer demand, etc. For an acquisition, investors would want 
to know considerable detail about the target firm, synergies between the firms, how the acquisition fits into the strategy 
of the firm, etc. Moreover, merger proxy statements can be hundreds of pages long. Thus, disclosures can take time to 
process adequately.  
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Given the volume of information and time constraints market participants face when processing 
firm news, overloaded individuals are susceptible to several well-documented biases that can 
negatively impact the effectiveness of information assimilation by the market. Academic research 
on bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) and limited investor attention (Merton, 1987; Bloomfield, 
2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) indicate that when investors lack sufficient time and/or resources 
to fully process all available information, they will rationally resort to simplified information 
processing techniques, or heuristics. These techniques may overlook or underweight relevant 
information leading to inferior decisions, resulting in various detrimental market effects related to 
liquidity, volatility and valuation (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Chewning and Harrell, 1990; Miller, 2010; 
You and Zhang, 2009; Lee, 2012; Lawrence, 2013; Loughran and McDonald, 2014).5 
Moreover, theories on ‘anchoring and adjustment’ predict that after an initial reference point 
has been set, future adjustments are inadequate (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Thus, time-
constrained individuals may make an initial assessment about a new disclosure based on 
preliminary analysis; however, when the period of high-intensity information processing has 
passed and there is time to revisit their initial judgment, subsequent adjustments will be 
incomplete. Importantly, anchoring and adjustment leads to incomplete adjustments even in the 
absence of new information (Epley and Gilovich, 2006).  
Although regulators govern firm disclosure and thus limit managers’ disclosure flexibility, there 
is still a nontrivial amount of discretion in firms’ disclosure choice. Managers’ arguably have the 
                                                   
5 As Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003, p.339) point out, “[i]nattention seems foolish…as inattentive investors lose money by 
ignoring aspects of the economic environment. However, if time and attention are costly, such behavior may be 
reasonable.” This intuition is also consistent with that in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Bloomfield (2002) in that higher 
processing costs leads to less information assimilation. See Section 2.2 for a more detailed discussion. 
4 
 
most flexibility to smooth voluntary disclosures (e.g., earnings guidance, product announcements, 
customer or supplier contracts); however, managers can also adjust the timing of many mandatory 
disclosures as well. Specifically, even though current SEC rules require firms to disclose material 
news, they are given leeway of up to four business days to disclose after the triggering event. 
Moreover, the designated date of the triggering event, i.e., ‘event date,’ may reflect some degree of 
managerial discretion, particularly for events that are firm choices (e.g., merger announcement). 
So, although these disclosures are mandated, there is still discretion related to the precise timing of 
the disclosure. Separating information-rich disclosures by even a couple days can greatly help 
investors process each disclosure more completely, particularly those that require additional 
analysis and follow up by the user to adequately process. Thus, disclosure smoothing can 
contribute to more complete information processing and therefore a better understanding of the 
firm and its prospects. Accordingly, we predict that disclosure smoothing should lead to better 
market outcomes, namely greater liquidity, lower volatility, and more accurate analyst forecasts. 6  
We conduct two sets of analyses. In our initial set, we attempt to determine whether managers 
do indeed engage in disclosure smoothing using three distinct approaches. In our first approach, 
we examine settings where there are multiple disclosures made related to the same event date. We 
find that when there are multiple events requiring disclosure on the same date, managers, on 
average, spread the disclosures out over the following several days. In order to rule out the 
possibility that managers smooth disclosures out because producing multiple same-day disclosures 
                                                   
6 Note too that we expect disclosure smoothing to be relevant even when there are relatively few disclosures in a given 
week or month. That is, firm disclosures are typically not uniformly distributed in time over the quarter; rather, they tend 
to be clustered around events within the quarter, while other periods in the quarter (such as quiet periods) tend to have 
few if any disclosures (NIRI, 2015). Therefore, managers may engage in disclosure smoothing to smooth out clustering 
even when the overall level of disclosure frequency is low.  
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is too time-consuming, we next examine whether recent disclosures (within the past three days) 
also explain a delay in the next disclosure. Consistent with managers smoothing disclosures to 
reduce information overload rather than because of disclosure costs, we find that managers are 
more likely to delay a disclosure (from its event date) when there has been a disclosure in the 
previous three days. Finally, we examine whether managers smooth disclosures during periods in 
which there are increased incentives to help investors fully process new information. We find that 
disclosure smoothing is more pronounced when (i) there is more information about the firm, (ii) 
the information environment is more robust, (iii) the firm has more complex information, (iv) there 
is more uncertainty about the firm and its prospects, and (v) when disclosure news is more positive. 
Collectively, these analyses provide robust evidence that suggest managers behave in a manner 
consistent with managers smoothing out disclosures. 
In our second set of analyses, we examine the market impact of disclosure smoothing. Prior 
literature suggests information overload contributes to adverse selection problems that reduce 
incentives to trade (Miller, 2010), increase the amount of time required to make a trading decision 
(Cohen, 1980; Jacoby et al. 1974), and reduce decision quality (Abdel-Khalik, 1973; Chewning and 
Harrell, 1990). We predict that disclosure smoothing offsets these negative effects by allowing 
investors to more fully process each disclosure. Consistent with these predictions, we find that 
disclosure smoothing is associated with increased liquidity, reduced stock price volatility, and 
increased analyst forecast accuracy. We generate these results using two proxies for disclosure 
smoothing: (i) minus one times the number of firm-initiated press releases disclosed less than 3 
days apart (Short Interval Smoothing) and, (ii) minus one times the standard deviation of the number 
of hours between firm-initiated press releases (Variance Smoothing). We also use two methods to 
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improve our empirical identification: (i) entropy balancing, which is a quasi-matching technique 
that ensures covariate balance between treatment (high smoothing) and control (low smoothing) 
observations, and (ii) a changes regression specification.7 
In additional analyses, we consider a situation in which managers’ incentives to group 
disclosures closer together (“bundle” disclosures) may dominate their incentives to smooth 
disclosures. Specifically, we analyze whether managers bundle disclosures in order to provide 
more net positive news to the market. We find that (i) managers are more likely to disclose good 
news after a bad news disclosure, and (ii) managers disclose good news more quickly after bad 
news than they do after good or neutral news. This evidence is consistent with managers bundling 
(as opposed to smoothing) disclosures when they have negative news.8 
Our research provides a contribution along two dimensions. First, we contribute to the extensive 
information overload literature (Miller, 2010; You and Zhang, 2009; Lee, 2012; Lawrence, 2013) that 
documents numerous adverse effects of information overload, particularly those related to costly 
capital market frictions. In contrast to these studies that focus on the impact to investors (i.e., users 
of information), we focus on the relation between information overload and managers (i.e., suppliers 
of information). In particular, we provide evidence suggesting that managers can adjust the timing 
of their disclosures to help investors combat information overload. Second, our findings are 
relevant to regulators with long-held concerns about information overload, as they are trying to 
                                                   
7 In Section 4, we discuss the entropy balancing methodology and its advantages in our setting.   
8 Prior empirical evidence has documented a recent increase in the frequency of “bundled” management forecasts, or 
management earnings forecasts issued concurrently with earnings announcements (e.g., Anilowski et al., 2007, Rogers 
and Buskirk, 2013). In untabulated analyses, we find that both of our measures of disclosure smoothing are negatively 
and significantly associated with the practice of bundling guidance and earnings announcements. These results suggest 
that firms that smooth more are less likely to bundle and more likely to disclose guidance separately from earnings, 
consistent with distinct incentives driving bundling and smoothing decisions. 
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determine alternative approaches to combat this growing trend. We argue that rather than reduce 
disclosure, which can actually lead to further impairments of the information environment, firms 
can smooth the timing of their disclosures to help investors more thoroughly process news about 
the firm, thereby leading to improved market outcomes.  
2. Motivation  
In this section, we discuss the various factors contributing to information overload and their 
growth over time. We then discuss the ways in which information overload adversely impacts 
investors and what regulators are doing to try to address this issue. Finally, we highlight managers’ 
views on information overload and how disclosure smoothing can help to address their concerns. 
2.1. Information overload in capital markets  
Efficient capital markets rely on disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and facilitate trade 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Accordingly, federal securities laws have long prioritized more 
disclosure as the preferred means for supporting fair and efficient capital markets (Paredes, 2003). 
However, over time the scope and breadth of disclosure requirements has continued to increase to 
the point that many experts have expressed concern that there is simply too much disclosure for 
investors to be able to process adequately (Paredes, 2003; Radin, 2007; KPMG, 2012; White, 2013; 
E&Y, 2014; Higgins, 2014).  
Beginning with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which were 
passed in response to the speculative bubble and subsequent crash of equity prices in the 1920’s 
and early 1930’s, disclosure has been a foundational principle of securities regulations (Thompson 
and Sale, 2003). In 1982, the SEC adopted another significant disclosure regulation, Regulation S-
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K, which standardized the set of disclosures that publicly listed firms were required to provide 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. With the adoption of Regulation S-K, the SEC also 
standardized the level of detail required in various sections of mandatory filings (Thompson and 
Sale, 2003). More recently, in the wake of corporate scandals in the early 2000’s, the SEC further 
increased the amount and frequency of mandatory disclosures through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002 by requiring the disclosure of an expanded number of corporate events. Additionally, from 
time to time the SEC updates rules and guidelines that often result in more disclosure. In recent 
years, these have included requirements for more disclosure on topics ranging from executive 
compensation to hedging transactions.9  
In addition to expanded mandatory disclosure rules, information overload has grown over time 
through the evolution of voluntary disclosure practices and its unintended consequences, 
particularly in the last couple decades. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995 
provided firms a “safe harbor” in making forward-looking statements so long as certain risks were 
disclosed. As a result, firms began releasing more forward-looking earnings guidance; however, 
they also added significantly more items to the list of risk factors such that these disclosures not 
only grew longer, but also became increasingly “boilerplate” and less informative.  
To provide a sense for the magnitude of the disclosure increase in recent years, in untabulated 
analysis, we find that the average number of filings per firm posted to the SEC’s EDGAR website 
has increased monotonically over the past 20 years, from 10.1 in 1996 to 30.8 in 2015. Over the same 
period, the average number of 8-K filings provided per firm-year has increased from 2.4 in 1996 to 
                                                   
9 In a recent study, Dyer, Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2017) find that much of the increase in 10K length is attributable to 
new disclosure requirements, including fair value accounting, internal controls and risk factors. 
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10.9 in 2015. Similarly, the aggregate number of firm-initiated press releases on the four major 
newswire services (PRNewswire, BusinessWire, MarketWire and Globe Newswire as collected 
from Factiva) more than tripled, increasing from 156,243 in 1996 to 505,818 in 2015. These trends 
suggest that disclosure frequency has increased dramatically over the past two decades alone and 
likely further contributed to the level of information overload. 
In addition to the significant growth in both mandatory and voluntary disclosure, there has been 
an increase in the coverage of firm disclosures by the media. In particular, when firms publicly 
release information, it typically triggers a “multiplier effect” in the form of firm-related articles 
produced by both traditional news outlets, e.g., newspapers, financial publications and news 
shows, and, increasingly, technology-enabled intermediaries, e.g., investor websites, blogs and 
social media (Drake et al. 2017). This coverage consists not only of the dissemination of information 
released by the firm, but also the provision of additional disclosure regarding a firm as the media 
analyze, summarize and interpret firm news, exacerbating information overload around firm-
initiated disclosures. As noted by Groysberg and Healy (2013, p. 47), “voluminous information is 
available at so little cost, leading to information overload. This is certainly true for many stocks 
where a wealth of information is available from the financial media, online investment advisors, 
and sell-side analysts, as well as from the company itself. It is thus challenging for portfolio 
managers to screen all the new information potentially available on a stock.” 
Importantly, information overload arises not only because of increased disclosure, but also 
because investors have limited time to process the information they receive. The notion that time 
constraints give rise to information overload has been addressed in prior literature, including by 
Shick et al. (1990) who model information overload arising from time constraints, and by Schroder 
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et al. (1967) and Snowball (1980), who show that information overload increases with the amount 
of information processed per unit of time. Moreover, Tuttle and Burton (1999) use an experimental 
setting to show that information overload arises primarily because of time constraints.  
2.2. Impact of information overload on investor behavior 
Prior literature is helpful in providing predictions regarding how information overload is likely 
to affect investor behavior. Simon (1955; 1978) contends that overloaded investors will rationally 
curtail information searching or processing and simplify their decision process within their 
processing constraints in order to achieve an acceptable outcome; that is, they tend to “satisfice” 
rather than “optimize.”10 The intuition is that investors have limited time and cognitive ability, and 
so must decide how much time and effort they want to expend on processing information, given 
the potential costs and benefits. They then rationally exclude pieces of information when it is too 
costly (net) to process all relevant information. Although adopting simplifying decision strategies 
that require less effort results in less accurate decisions, investors prefer this outcome given the 
decision-process tradeoffs. 
Limited investor attention theory similarly predicts incomplete information processing when 
investors have limited time or ability to detect less visible information. For example, Merton (1987) 
argues that it is costly for investors to gain awareness of a firm and low-visibility firms suffer a 
valuation penalty. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that because information acquisition is costly, 
stock prices will only reflect the information that informed investors have incurred the cost (and 
                                                   
10  Subsequent studies provide evidence supporting Simon’s predictions. For example, Einhorn (1971) finds that as 
information increases, individuals use mixed modeling strategies (“compound models”) in order to simplify the decision-
making process. Payne (1976) documents that when faced with information overload, individuals use heuristics to 
quickly eliminate some of the available alternatives without rigorously investigating them in order to reduce the number 
of alternatives in consideration. 
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earned the associated compensation) of acquiring. Similarly, Bloomfield (2002) contends that when 
information is costlier to interpret, it is reflected less completely in stock prices. Finally, Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2003) show that information presented in a more salient form is absorbed more quickly 
and completely by the market, consistent with investors having limited attention. Combined, these 
studies argue that when investors become overloaded with information and information 
acquisition costs increase, investors process less information.  
Consistent with these arguments, Eppler and Mengis (2004) note in their review of 97 empirical 
and experimental studies documenting the effects of information overload that although larger 
amounts of information can be helpful to decision-makers to a point, after that the performance of 
the decision-maker will rapidly decline. This literature suggests one reason that information 
overload reduces decision quality is that it makes it more difficult for decision-makers to identify 
the relationship between the details of the information and the higher-order inferences (Owen, 
1992; Schneider, 1987). Thus, even when information is processed and understood, information 
overload inhibits individuals from clearly understanding the inferences that are most decision-
relevant (i.e. “getting lost in the weeds”). 
Another impact of information overload is that individuals might knowingly omit relevant 
information or possible alternatives from their consideration as a technique to simplify the decision 
(Payne, 1976; Herbig & Kramer, 1994; Sparrow, 1999). Moreover, the process by which individuals 
choose which information to ignore, or rule out, is idiosyncratic and difficult to predict (Payne, 
1976). To the extent that overloaded investors knowingly omit relevant information from their 
investment valuation decisions, they are likely to be aware of their information disadvantage, 
which can increase adverse selection concerns. 
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Finally, information overload can increase variability and decrease predictability of how 
individuals interpret information. Einhorn (1971) was among the first to observe that as the set of 
available information increases, not only are individuals more likely to rely on simplifying 
heuristics to reach a decision, but they are also likely to do so in idiosyncratic ways. This reduces 
the consistency of the final decision relative to settings in which the information set is smaller. 
Chewning and Harrell (1990) provide additional evidence on information-overloaded decision 
makers using accounting information. They find that as information loads increased, participants 
varied relative to a benchmark in their predictions of a firm’s future financial distress. Additionally, 
prior literature finds that information overload decreases decision quality even for cognitively 
sophisticated individuals and financial professionals (Malhotra, 1982; Casey, 1980; Iselin, 1988). 
2.3. Regulatory concerns about information overload  
Although there have been significant increases in disclosure requirements in recent years, 
securities market regulators have long been concerned about the problem of information overload. 
In 1969, an SEC-sponsored commission concluded that some disclosures, including prospectus 
disclosures, had grown too long and overly complex, thereby laying the foundation for subsequent 
disclosure reforms. 11  In its 1976 landmark case establishing standards of materiality (TSC 
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.), the Supreme Court was mindful of the risk that establishing a 
lower materiality threshold could contribute to information overload. As stated by Supreme Court 
Justice Marshall, “[M]anagement’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply 
                                                   
11 See history of the Wheat Report: http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/tbi/gogo_d.php  
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to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information — a result that is hardly conducive 
to informed decision making.” 
Over the intervening decades, concerns of information overload have prompted multiple 
initiatives to simplify disclosures. In 1995, the SEC formed the Task Force on Disclosure 
Simplification, whose recommendations included (among other things) that the Commission 
should “eliminate or modify many rules and forms, and simplify several key aspects of securities 
offerings.”  The work of the Task Force led to the adoption of “Plain English” rules in 1998 that 
were intended to improve the readability of SEC filings.  
More recently, reducing information overload and improving disclosure effectiveness has been 
a top priority of the SEC. This focus has been reinforced by congressional mandates requiring the 
SEC to study disclosure effectiveness.12 The SEC has responded by initiating a broad review of its 
current disclosure regime.13  These initiatives are ongoing but initial indications from the SEC 
indicate a wide range of possible changes to the current disclosure regime. Some proposals include 
changing from a rules-based to a principle-based disclosure framework, requiring information to 
be presented in more user-friendly formats and providing more summary-type information or 
multi-tiered reports that allow users to read information at their preferred detail level (White, 2016).  
2.4. Managers’ efforts to combat information overload 
In addition to regulatory concerns, there is evidence that managers also recognize the problem 
of information overload and are taking steps to mitigate its effects. As stated by a senior executive 
at Ford, “We often find ourselves challenged in balancing our disclosures between what is required 
                                                   
12 JOBS Act, Section 108 requires the SEC to comprehensively analyze the rules of the current disclosure regime.  
13 See SEC concept release for updating Regulation S-K: https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf  
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and what is relevant for the users, particularly when either the disclosure is for something that is 
immaterial, or when the volume or content of the required disclosure could obfuscate the important 
information” (emphasis added).  Similarly, a recent survey of 120 firms found that managers’ own 
concerns about providing clear and informative disclosure are a primary motivation for them to 
initiate disclosure simplification initiatives (E&Y, 2014). Additionally, there are several recent high-
profile examples of firms recognizing the need to simplify their disclosures and investing 
significant resources in order to do so even in the absence of a regulatory mandate. For example, in 
speaking of his 2013 annual report which contained over 100,000 words, the CFO of GE lamented 
that “not a single retail investor on planet Earth could get through it, let alone understand it.” These 
and other concerns related to information overload prompted GE to undertake a costly disclosure 
simplification effort.14 
A complicating factor, however, in combatting information overload is that reducing disclosure 
length and/or complexity is a nontrivial task. Survey evidence suggests that these efforts are limited 
by a hesitancy to remove or update stale information, uncertainty about materiality thresholds, 
pressure to conform to prevailing practices and the inherent difficulty of making complicated 
disclosures clear and concise (E&Y, 2014).  Even for managers who are motivated to simplify their 
disclosures, there is the difficult challenge of determining which information to remove or simplify.  
As stated by IASB Chairman Hans Hoogervorst, “One investor’s disclosure clutter is another 
investor’s golden nugget of information. Taking information away is never easy.” Thus, 
                                                   
14 See WSJ article on GE’s disclosure simplification efforts available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2015/06/02/the-109894-
word-annual-report/  
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overcoming information overload by reducing disclosure length or complexity is likely to be a 
difficult task for many firms. 
In contrast, rather than remove disclosures, managers can use discretion in the timing of their 
disclosures to temporally smooth out the disclosures. By smoothing out disclosures, firms can 
provide smaller amounts of information at any one point in time, thereby allowing investors to 
more fully assimilate each firm disclosure, as compared to providing multiple disclosures at one 
time. Importantly, when new information is disclosed by the firm, interpreting and assimilating 
the new information is likely to involve much more than simply reading the disclosure. Prior 
literature documenting how investors and analysts assimilate information shows that it is a time-
consuming process that often involves information acquisition from various other sources in order 
to interpret a single piece of new information from the firm (Brown et al., 2015, 2018; Soltes, 2014; 
Chapman, Miller and White, 2018).  For example, a firm could announce an acquisition in a press 
release that may be no longer than a few pages.  Reading the press release may only require a trivial 
amount of time. However, assimilating this information with all of the prior information (both 
public and private) available to the investor or analyst could take much longer. They would 
reasonably want to find out a broad range of information related to how the acquisition will change 
the future prospects of the firm, which may require contacting customers, suppliers, other investors 
or even the managers of the firm in order to understand all of the relevant details.  
Moreover, a disclosure of an acquisition would likely elicit significant media coverage, including 
analyses and opinions, which would add to the large amount of assimilation that must occur to 
properly value the economic event. To the extent investors learn of this acquisition during periods 
of information overload, they might either (partially) ignore the other disclosures or spend less 
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time understanding the acquisition, resulting in increased uncertainty about the firm and it 
prospects. To at least partially combat information overload, managers can smooth the timing of 
their disclosures. Separating information-rich disclosures by even a couple days can help investors 
fully process the new information. 
3. Sample  
To conduct our analyses, we start by collecting all 8-K filings for which event and disclosure 
dates are available from 2000 to 2013. We also collect articles from the RavenPack Dow Jones and 
PR Edition database from January 2000 to July 2013. We follow the approach in Bushman et al. 
(2017) to identify firm-initiated press releases, and we exclude all articles with a relevance score 
lower than 90.15  Since our primary interest is in disclosures initiated by the firms themselves, we 
also exclude articles from media outlets, such as the Wall Street Journal, and keep only ‘Press 
Release’ type articles.16 In cases where the firm issues multiple press releases within a 15-minute 
period, we assume these are duplicates and remove them from the sample.17 These exclusions result 
in an initial sample of 1,274,876 press releases from 8,134 firms. We then group these disclosures 
by quarter and delete firm-quarters with fewer than two press releases.  
Table 1 presents our firm-quarter sample selection process. We exclude observations without 
the necessary data on Compustat and CRSP to construct our main variables, namely total assets, 
                                                   
15 The relevance score is assigned by RavenPack to measure how strongly the firm is related to the underlying news story. 
The scores range from 0 (low relation) to 100 (high relation). 
16 Other RavenPack type articles include News Flash, Tabular Material, and Full Article. News flash articles rebroadcast 
headline information from the initial press release issued by the firm. Full articles contain additional editorial content. 
17 We validate this assumption across the subset of observations for which the unique subject of the press release is 
identified in RavenPack (via the novelty score). We find that eliminating subsequent press releases within 15 minutes 
correctly removes duplicates in 80.7% of cases. We find similar results when using the same process over 5, 10 or 30-
minute intervals.  
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shareholders equity, the number of shares outstanding, daily stock returns, daily trading volume, 
daily bid and ask quotes, prior 12 month returns and earnings over the prior 5 quarters.  This 
process results in a sample of 170,764 quarterly observations from 6,219 unique firms. The sample 
is reduced to 131,216 observations when we impose a minimum of two EPS quarterly analyst 
forecasts in I/B/E/S in the current and prior quarter for our analyst forecast accuracy tests. 
In our initial set of analyses examining managerial smoothing behavior, we focus on the distance 
between the event date and disclosure date to infer smoothing behavior. In our second set of 
analyses, where we examine market outcomes, we use two proxies for our primary variable of 
interest, Smoothing, that are more general in nature to allow us to examine smoothing over longer 
windows.18,19 Specifically, for our first proxy, we calculate the number of disclosures that are within 
a three-day interval. For each firm-initiated press release, we compute the number of days since the 
last firm-initiated press release. If this interval is less than 3 full days, we consider the release a 
short interval disclosure. We then count the number of short interval disclosures made by the firm 
over the quarter and multiply it by minus one. The intuition is that if managers smooth disclosures 
over the quarter to avoid information overload, there should be fewer disclosures made within 
short intervals. We calculate our second smoothing measure as minus one times the standard 
                                                   
18 As we note in the introduction, managers can adjust not just the timing of their disclosures, but for some events, they 
can also influence the stated event date. This is particularly true for events for which there is managerial discretion as to 
when the event will occur. For example, managers have some discretion as to when they announce a merger or the 
firing/resignation of an employee or board member; however, there is less discretion in determining an event date for 
events beyond managers’ control. In our initial analyses, we assume the event date filed with the SEC is correct; however, 
even if some event dates were adjusted, this should bias against our findings, since there is no need to delay the disclosure 
date when the event date can be adjusted. That is, it would just bring attention to the delay. In our second set of analyses, 
we relax this assumption to allow for the event and/or disclosure dates to be adjusted.     
19 Untabulated analysis indicates that the delay in the disclosure of multiple 8-Ks is positively and significantly associated 
with our Short-Interval Smoothing measure, suggesting that firms that spread out multiple-event 8-Ks are also firms that 
tend to more generally spread out their press releases. 
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deviation of the number of hours between firm-initiated press releases disclosed during the quarter 
divided by 100. The intuition behind this variable is that it measures the extent to which disclosures 
are made over consistent intervals of time during the quarter. Firms with more variation in the 
length of time between their disclosures will have a higher standard deviation of the number of 
hours between disclosures and therefore have less “smooth” (i.e., more clustered) disclosures by 
our definition. In addition, keeping the number of disclosures constant, a lower standard deviation 
represents longer spacing between any two disclosures made over the quarter. See Figure 1 for an 
illustration comparing variations in smoothing. Given the median level of Short-Interval 
Smoothing (Variance Smoothing) in our sample of -1 (-3.327), the moderate smoothing example in 
Figure 1 best reflects the degree of smoothing in our sample. Note that we do not expect firms to 
have ‘perfect’ smoothing across a quarter, but rather that firms will simply adjust their disclosures 
by a few days to temporally distance disclosures.  
Table 2, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics. The average (median) firm in our sample 
discloses 7.17 (5) press releases per quarter and has 6.87 (5) analysts. Table 3 provides information 
on the topics of the disclosures in our sample, as provided by RavenPack.20 The most common topic 
is earnings, including both announcements and guidance, closely followed by product and service 
related disclosures.  
4. Research design and empirical results 
In this section, we discuss our empirical approach to examine how disclosure smoothing 
improves the information environment and capital market outcomes. We begin by establishing 
                                                   
20 RavenPack provides topic descriptions for around 47% of the releases in our sample. The proportions presented in 
Table 3 are therefore relative to the sample of press releases for which there is a topic description available. 
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whether managers do indeed engage in disclosure smoothing in an attempt to benefit the firm. We 
conduct this investigation by analyzing when managers choose to disclose events occurring on the 
same day; we use 8-K filings for which the disclosure date and event date are both observable. 
Second, we construct a determinants model based on firm characteristics which we would expect 
motivate managers to help investors fully understand their disclosures. Next, we turn to the 
consequences of disclosure smoothing based on our prediction that it improves capital market 
outcomes and the information environment of the firm. More specifically, we examine the relation 
between disclosure smoothing and trading liquidity, stock price volatility, and analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy using both levels and changes specifications. Lastly, in the additional analyses 
section, we consider managers’ incentives to bundle good news with bad news. 
Our approach to studying the determinants of disclosure smoothing is to use a standard OLS 
regression to test whether smoothing is more common under the conditions we predict. However, 
throughout our empirical tests of the consequences of disclosure smoothing, we use two methods 
to improve the empirical identification of our results. First, we employ an entropy balancing 
technique, which is a quasi-matching approach that weights each observation such that post-
weighting distributional properties of treatment and control observations are virtually identical, 
thereby ensuring covariate balance (Hainmueller, 2011; McMullin and Schonberger, 2015; 
Chapman et al. 2018).21  
                                                   
21 In comparison to propensity score matching, which effectively weights observations on a binary scale (meaning they 
are either included or excluded), entropy balancing weights observations on a continuous scale, thereby preserving the 
entire sample and ensuring covariate balance by identifying the precise weights of control observations that allow for an 
optimal weighted match with treatment observations. Entropy balancing works by first determining the mean and 
variance of the treatment observations, which become the target mean and variance of the post-weighting control sample 
(also known as the “balance conditions”). The algorithm proceeds by first assigning possible weights to control 
observations and then testing whether the balance conditions have been met (meaning distributional properties of 
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We implement entropy balancing by first splitting our sample into high and low smoothing 
observations (based on the median value for smoothing across our sample). We then use the Stata 
ebalance function to force covariate balance among high and low smoothing observations along 
the determinants of smoothing used in Table 5: disclosure length (Length of Press Releases), firm size 
(Log Assets), an indicator for multiple reporting segments (Segments), earnings volatility (Earnings 
Volatility), cumulative press release returns (Cumulative Press Release Returns), and disclosure 
frequency (Number of Press Releases).  
As an additional method to improve the empirical identification of our results, and because 
disclosure patterns have changed over time and are likely to have different levels across firms, we 
replicate all of our level regressions using changes regressions. 
4.1. Main analysis 
4.1.1 Delays in the disclosure of 8-Ks 
To provide initial evidence that managers intentionally smooth out disclosures to avoid 
information overload, we analyze the timing of 8-K disclosures, for which both the disclosure date 
and underlying event date are identifiable. Our sample of 8-Ks excludes amendments. We begin 
by looking at the distribution of the distance in days between event and filing dates for 8-Ks. Table 
4 Panel A presents the results. The data suggests that firms promptly file 8-Ks when there are no 
other events on the event day, with a median (mean) delay of 1 day (3.4 days). However, when 
                                                   
treatment and post-weighted control observations are identical). The algorithm repeats this process over multiple 
iterations until a set of weights for control observations are found such that the balance conditions are met. Treatment 
observations are not re-weighted, meaning they retain their default weighting of one while control observations are 
assigned a positive weight that may be greater or less than one. After the algorithm finishes assigning weights to each 
observation, these weights are used in subsequent regression analyses. 
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there are multiple events on the same day, we observe a clear pattern of staggered delays. The 
median (mean) number of days between the event date and filing date are 0, 3, 4 and 5 (2.2, 8.0, 12.4 
and 16.2) for the first, second, third and fourth 8-Ks on the same event date, respectively. 22 
Extending this analysis in a regression framework, we estimate the following equation: 
 
Distance between Event Date and 8-k Filing Dateit= β0  
 + β1 Number of 8-Ks with the same Event Dateit+ βk Firm-Year-Quarter Fixed Effects+εit (1) 
 
The unit of observation is each 8-K. The variable of interest is the count of firm 8-Ks with the 
same event date (i.e., report date). We include firm-year or firm-quarter fixed-effects to control for 
firm and time characteristics that may be related to the delay in disclosure. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. We predict that firms will delay the disclosure of 8-Ks when they have multiple 
triggering events on the same day. Table 4 Panel B presents the results. We find evidence consistent 
with managers delaying the disclosures of concurrent news, which is consistent with managers 
timing disclosures to minimize information overload.  
Complex information takes more time to adequately process. Thus, we also split the sample of 
8-Ks into high and low complexity, based on the sample median of the Gunning Fog Readability 
Index. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 Panel B present the results. We find that the delay in the 
disclosure of concurrent news is significantly longer for high complexity 8-Ks, consistent with 
                                                   
22 In August of 2004, the SEC shortened the filing deadline for all mandatory 8-K items to four business days (from the 
prior deadlines of between 5 and 15 days depending on the item). Our sample includes pre-2004 8-Ks as well as voluntary 
8-Ks, which do not have to follow the 4-business day deadline. In untabulated tests, we exclude pre-2004 and voluntary 
8-Ks and replicate the tests in Table 4. Although the mean delays get shorter and within SEC deadlines, we still observe 
a similar pattern of staggered delays when there are multiple events on the same day for mandatory 8-Ks after 2004. 
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managers delaying the disclosure of concurrent information more when the information is more 
complex and harder to process. 
One possible alternative explanation of this result is that when multiple events occur on the same 
day, managers are too busy to disclose them immediately or disclosure costs otherwise limit the 
timeliness of the 8-K filing. In order to rule out this alternative explanation, we next examine 
whether recent prior disclosures (within the past three days) also predict a delay in the next 
disclosure. If managers are delaying because of disclosure costs, we would not expect a previous 
disclosure to explain a future delay because the costs of the previous disclosure have already been 
incurred. Consistent with managers smoothing disclosures to reduce overload rather than because 
of disclosure costs, Table 4 Panel C shows that managers are more likely to delay a disclosure (from 
its event date) when there has been a disclosure in the previous three days. This result supports 
our view that managers delay or smooth disclosures at least in part to minimize information 
overload. 
4.1.2 Determinants of disclosure smoothing 
We next analyze the association between disclosure smoothing and five information-related 
characteristics which we would expect motivate managers to help investors fully understand their 
disclosures: information quantity, information environment, information complexity, information 
uncertainty, and information content. We focus on these information-related characteristics 
because we believe each represents a different dimension of information that might affect investors’ 
processing costs. In particular, we examine information quantity because investors can get 
overloaded with too much information in a short period of time, such that firms have incentives to 
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smooth out disclosures, allowing more time for investors to fully process firm disclosures. We use 
the length of press releases (Length of Press Releases) to proxy for information quantity.  
We consider the firm information environment since more information available to investors 
from other sources, such as analysts, media, etc. (Blankespoor, Miller and White, 2013), may also 
lead to overload. We expect that managers anticipate the increased likelihood of information 
overload with a more robust information environment and increase disclosure smoothing to offset 
this potential effect. We use firm size (Log of Assets) as our empirical proxy for the information 
environment. We use firm size to capture a richer information environment rather than the actual 
number of media articles following a particular disclosure or actual press releases in an industry, 
because we are trying to capture the ex ante expectation of overload, and it is difficult for a manager 
to know exactly when, and how much, their disclosure will coincide with other information outside 
the firm’s control.23   
We examine information complexity, as prior literature documents incomplete processing of 
complex disclosures (Plumlee, 2003). We expect that managers anticipate the increased likelihood 
of information overload with complex disclosures and smooth disclosures accordingly. We use an 
indicator variable for multiple reporting segments (Segments) to proxy for information complexity. 
We also examine information uncertainty, as investors’ information processing costs should be 
higher when there is greater uncertainty about the firm and its prospects. We use the volatility of 
prior firm performance (Earnings Volatility) to proxy for uncertainty (Billings, Jennings and Lev, 
2015). When uncertainty is high, there is a greater chance of increased stock price volatility and 
                                                   
23 Coefficient signs and statistical significance are similar when, in untabulated tests, we use lagged analyst and media 
coverage as proxies for the firms’ information environment. 
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lower firm valuation. Thus, managers have an incentive to smooth disclosure in an attempt to help 
reduce uncertainty.  
Lastly, we consider information content. Prior literature documents managers’ incentives to 
provide timely disclosures of bad news. For example, Skinner (1997) finds that managers can 
reduce potential litigation costs by providing timely disclosures of bad news. Similarly, Graham et. 
al. (2005) find that managers believe they can increase credibility with investors by not delaying 
bad news disclosures. In our setting, this would imply more smoothing as news become more 
positive.  
We test these predictions by estimating the following OLS regression, as indicated: 
 
Smoothingit = β0+ β1Length of Press Releasesit+ β2Log of Assetsit   
 + β3Segmentsit + β4Earnings Volatilityit + β5Cumulative Press Release Returnsit  
 
 
 + β6Number of Press Releasesit + Fixed-Effects + εit, 
 
(2) 
 
where Smoothing is one of our two smoothing measures: Short-Interval Smoothing or Variance 
Smoothing. Short-Interval Smoothing is minus one times the number of firm-initiated press releases 
disclosed less than 3 days apart, and Variance Smoothing is minus one times the standard deviation 
of the number of hours between firm-initiated press releases divided by 100. Both variables increase 
in disclosure smoothing. Length of Press Releases is the log of the total number of characters in the 
disclosures made by the firm over the quarter; Log of Assets is the log of total assets in the current 
fiscal quarter; Segments is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported more than one 
business or geographic segment in the year; Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation of earnings 
before extraordinary items in the same fiscal quarter in the five prior years scaled by average total 
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assets; and Cumulative Press Release Returns, our proxy for the overall sign and magnitude of the 
news disclosed during the quarter, is the sum of the market-adjusted firm stock returns on the days 
of press release disclosures during the quarter. We also control for disclosure frequency (Number of 
Press Releases) given the likelihood that our measures of smoothing are related to the number of 
press releases provided during the quarter. 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating Equation (1), where Column 1 (2) reports the results for 
Short-Interval Smoothing (Variance Smoothing) with industry and year fixed effects. Consistent with 
our predictions, the coefficient estimates for β1 to β5 are statistically significant in the expected 
positive directions. These results suggest that managers engage in disclosure smoothing in a way 
consistent with their anticipation of information overload and their incentive to mitigate its effects.  
We find a negative (positive) relationship between the number of press releases and Short-
Interval Smoothing (Variance Smoothing). We interpret this as likely due to a relationship between 
disclosure frequency and our proxies for smoothing, which is unsurprising given how the proxies 
are constructed. This result motivates our steps to control for disclosure frequency in the 
subsequent tests of the market outcomes associated with disclosure smoothing, either by including 
a control variable, or by taking fixed effects for the number of press releases, which we do in all 
results presented in Tables 6 through 9.  
On a related note, the coefficient estimate on β4 (representing a positive relationship between 
earnings volatility and disclosure smoothing) helps to address the potential concern that our 
subsequent results reflect smooth economic conditions at the firm rather than smooth disclosure 
patterns. This concern is based on the intuition that firms with smooth economic conditions might 
naturally have smooth disclosures. However, the positive relationship between disclosure 
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smoothing and earnings volatility suggests the opposite; disclosure smoothing is more pronounced 
when economic conditions are more volatile.24  
4.1.3 Disclosure smoothing and trading liquidity 
Prior literature suggests that when confronted with information overload, investors are more 
likely to rely upon heuristics to process large amounts of information, which often omits relevant 
information from the decision process (Simon, 1955; Einhorn, 1971, Payne 1976; Herbig & Kramer, 
1994; Sparrow, 1999). Because overloaded investors using these simplifying techniques are likely 
to recognize their potential information disadvantage, they may rationally abstain from trading in 
order to avoid adverse selection (Miller, 2010). However, in the presence of smoothing, investors 
are less likely to rely on heuristics because they have more time to process each new disclosure, 
thereby reducing their perceived information disadvantage. Thus, they are more willing to trade at 
low cost (Harris 1990).25 Accordingly, we predict that disclosure smoothing will increase liquidity.  
We test the effect of disclosure smoothing on liquidity by estimating the following OLS 
regression across the entropy-balanced sample, as indicated: 
 
Liquidityit  or Turnoverit or Average Bid-Askit= β0+ β1Smoothingit    
 + β2Number of Press Releasesit + β3Length of Press Releasesit + β4Log Assetsit   
 + β5Number of Analystsit + β6Segmentsit + β7Earnings Volatilityit   
 + β8Volatility Prior 12-Month Returnsit + β9Proportion of Bad News Releasesit   
 + β10Cumulative PR Returnsit + β11Market-to-Bookit + β12Leverageit+ β13ROAit    
 + β14Prior 12-Month Returnsit  + β15Lossit + Fixed-Effects + εit , (3) 
   
                                                   
24 In our subsequent tests, we further address this potential concern by controlling for earnings volatility. 
25 Harris (1990, p.3) states, “A market is liquid if traders can quickly buy or sell large numbers of shares when they want 
and at low transaction costs. Liquidity is the willingness of some traders (often but not necessarily dealers) to take the 
opposite side of a trade that is initiated by someone else, at low cost” (Emphasis added).  
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where we use three measures of stock liquidity: (i) minus one times the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure during the quarter, calculated as the average of the absolute value of the daily return-to-
volume ratio (Liquidity); (ii) the sum of the daily share volume divided by total shares outstanding 
in the quarter (Turnover); and (iii) the average of the daily ask minus the daily bid quotes during 
the quarter according to CRSP (Average Bid-Ask). Short-Interval Smoothing and Variance Smoothing 
are our two variables of interest and are measured as described in Equation (2). We control for 
various factors likely to explain liquidity or to be related to the timing of disclosures such as 
disclosure frequency (Number of Press Releases), which is included either as a control variable or as 
a fixed effect, 26  information quantity (Length of Press Releases), firm size (Log Assets), analyst 
coverage (Number of Analysts), business complexity (Segments), earnings uncertainty (Earnings 
Volatility), prior return volatility (Volatility Prior 12-Month Returns), disclosure content (Proportion of 
Bad News Releases and Cumulative Press Release Returns), firm valuation (Market-to-Book), capital 
structure (Leverage), profitability (ROA), prior returns (Prior 12-month Returns), and earnings losses 
(Loss). When Average Bid-Ask is the dependent variable, we also include stock price (Average Price) 
in order to control for the differences in spread caused by differences in stock price levels. We 
expect disclosure smoothing will increase liquidity, leading to a prediction of β1  > 0 in Equation (3) 
when the dependent variable is Liquidity or Turnover and a prediction of β1 < 0 when the dependent 
variable is Average Bid-Ask.  
Table 6 Panel A (B) reports the results for Short-Interval Smoothing (Variance Smoothing). In order 
to fully control for disclosure frequency, we report the results using two specifications for each 
                                                   
26 Controlling for the number of press releases helps mitigate the potential concern that our measure of smoothing is 
mechanically related to press release frequency. 
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dependent variable, including (i) the number of press releases as a control variable, or (ii) the 
number of press releases as a fixed effect. The coefficient estimates for β1 are consistent with our 
predicted sign and statistically significant, with the exception that the coefficient estimate on Short-
Interval Smoothing in the second specification of Turnover in Panel A is positive (as predicted) but 
not significant (t-stat= 1.15). Overall, these results support our prediction that disclosure smoothing 
is associated with increased liquidity. 
4.1.4 Disclosure smoothing and market uncertainty 
Next, we analyze the relation between disclosure smoothing and both investor uncertainty and 
analyst error. Prior literature indicates that information overload reduces decision accuracy or 
quality (Einhorn, 1971; Payne, 1976; Cohen, 1980; Malhotra 1982; Chewning & Harrell, 1990; Eppler 
and Mengis, 2004). Not only are overloaded investors more likely to make errors in judgments, 
prior literature suggests they are likely to do so in inconsistent ways (Chewning and Harrell, 1990). 
Consistent with this intuition, Loughran and McDonald (2014) show that larger 10K filings are 
associated with increased stock price volatility.  
To the extent that disclosure smoothing mitigates these effects for investors, we expect 
disclosure smoothing to be negatively associated with stock price volatility. Further, to the extent 
disclosure smoothing helps analysts more effectively process information, we predict disclosure 
smoothing should be positively associated with forecast accuracy. We test these predictions by 
estimating the following OLS regression, as indicated: 
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Stock Volatilityit  or Analyst Forecast Accuracyit = β0+ β1Smoothingit    
 + β2Number of Press Releasesit + β3Length of Press Releasesit + β4Log Assetsit   
 + β5Number of Analystsit + β6Segmentsit + β7Earnings Volatilityit   
 + β8Vol. Prior 12-Month Returnsit + β9Prop. Bad News Releasesit   
 + β10Cumulative PR Returnsit + β11Market-to-Bookit + β12Leverageit+ β13ROAit    
 + β14Prior 12-Month Returnsit  + β15Lossit + Fixed-Effects + εit , (4) 
   
where StockVolatility equals the standard deviation of stock returns during the quarter, Analyst 
Forecast Accuracy is minus one times the absolute difference between the median quarterly analyst 
EPS forecast consensus and the actual, scaled by the stock price at the end of the quarter. We control 
for disclosure frequency (Number of Press Releases), which is included either as a control variable or 
as a fixed effect, information quantity (Length of Press Releases), firm size (Log Assets), analyst 
coverage (Number of Analysts), business complexity (Segments), earnings uncertainty (Earnings 
Volatility), return volatility (Volatility Prior 12-Month Returns), disclosure content (Proportion of Bad 
News Releases and Cumulative Press Release Returns), firm valuation (Market-to-Book), capital 
structure (Leverage), profitability (ROA), prior returns (Prior 12-month Returns), and earnings losses 
(Loss). We predict β1 < 0 (β1 > 0) when Stock Volatility (Forecast Accuracy) is the dependent variable in 
Equation (4). 
Table 7 reports the results of estimating Equation (4) when Stock Volatility is the dependent 
variable. Panel A (B) reports the results for Short-Interval Smoothing (Variance Smoothing). We report 
the results using two specifications, including (i) the number of press releases as a control variable, 
and (ii) the number of press releases as a fixed effect.  The coefficient estimates for β1 are in the 
expected directions and statistically significant across both estimation methods. This supports our 
prediction that disclosure smoothing mitigates the volatility-increasing effect of information 
overload. 
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Table 8 reports the results of estimating Equation (4) when Forecast Accuracy is the dependent 
variable. Panel A (B) reports the results for Short-Interval Smoothing (Variance Smoothing). The 
coefficient estimates for β1 are in the expected directions and statistically significant across both 
estimation methods for Short-Interval Smoothing and Variance Smoothing. These results support our 
prediction that disclosure smoothing mitigates the effect of information overload. 
4.2. Additional analyses 
4.2.1 Changes specifications 
To provide additional support for our main inferences and improve our empirical identification, 
we replicate the results in Tables 6 through 8 using changes specifications. In each regression, we 
convert all variables to measures of changes from the previous period. Table 9 Panel A (B) reports 
the results of estimating the corresponding equations for Short-Interval Smoothing (Variance 
Smoothing). For Short-Interval Smoothing, we find statistically significant coefficient estimates in the 
predicted direction for four of the five dependent variables (the exception is change in stock 
volatility, which remains negative as expected but is no longer statistically significant). For Variance 
Smoothing, we also find statistically significant coefficient estimates in the predicted direction for 
four of the five dependent variables (the exception is change in turnover, which remains positive 
as expected but is no longer statistically significant). Overall, these results support our main 
inferences.  
4.2.2 Bundling of negative news 
In our main analyses, we show that managers smooth earnings when they have incentives to 
help investors fully process information and that smoothing facilitates better market outcomes. In 
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this section, we consider whether managers might bundle (rather than smooth) disclosures when 
they have bad news. Our intuition follows from prior research (e.g., Waymire 1984) indicating that 
managers bundle bad news with good news to avoid negative market impacts. To conduct this 
analysis, we model (i) the provision of a subsequent positive disclosure (Next PR is Positive) and (ii) 
the amount of time until the next positive disclosure (Number of Days Until Next Positive PR) as a 
function of a negative current disclosure as described in the following regression: 
 
Next PR is Positiveit or Number of Days Until Next Positive PRit= β0  
 + β1 Current PR is Negativeit + Firm-Year or Firm-Year-Quarter Fixed Effects + εit (5) 
 
where Next PR is Positive is a binary indicator variable for a positive news subsequent press release 
and Number of Days Until Next Positive PR measures the number of days until the next positive news 
disclosure. Both measures are constructed from indicators of the tone of the news available in the 
RavenPack database, which categorize news events as either positive, neutral, or negative.27 To the 
extent that managers accelerate good news disclosures following the release of bad news, we expect 
a positive coefficient on β1 when Next PR is Positive is the dependent variable, and a negative 
coefficient estimate on β1 when Number of Days Until Next Positive PR is the dependent variable.  
Consistent with this prediction, Panel A of Table 10 shows that managers are more likely to 
disclose good news after a bad news disclosure. Moreover, Panel B of Table 10 indicates that 
managers disclose good news more quickly after bad news than they do after good or neutral news. 
                                                   
27 We follow Bushman et. al. (2017) in using the Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) provided by Ravenpack to categorize 
news stories as positive, neutral or negative. The CSS score ranges from 0 to 100, with values below 50 indicating negative 
news, values equal to 50 indicating neutral news and values greater than 50 indicating positive news. The CSS score is 
the combination of five proprietary sentiment measures that combine textual analysis (identifying emotionally charged 
words and phrases), expert categorization of topics likely to cause positive or negative short-term market reaction, and 
an algorithm that ensures agreement among the five sentiment measures. The five sentiment measures are PEQ, BEE, 
BMQ, BCA and BAM. Detailed definitions of these measures are described in Appendix A of Bushman et. al. (2017). 
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This evidence is consistent with managers bundling (as opposed to smoothing) disclosures when 
they have negative news. 
As additional evidence of managers bundling disclosures by accelerating good news 
conditional on prior bad news, we look at the reporting delay in 8-K filings of good news after bad 
news. We modify Equation (5) by creating an interaction variable between Current PR is Negative 
and Next PR is Positive and regressing it on the distance between the event date and disclosure date 
of the next release. Panel C of Table 10 reports the result of estimating this equation on the 8-K 
sample. We find that managers reduce the delay between the event and disclosure date of the next 
good news 8-K when the current press release is negative. We interpret this result as additional 
evidence of managers bundling bad news by accelerating disclosure of good news. Our findings 
are related to those of Niessner (2015), who suggests that managers are more likely to disclose 
negative news during low investor attention periods (on Fridays, before national holidays and after 
the market closes). While Niessner (2015) documents evidence consistent with strategic timing of 
negative news 8-Ks, we document evidence consistent with strategic timing of good news following 
negative news. 
4.3 Robustness tests 
We perform a series of untabulated sensitivity tests. We find that results from Tables 5 to 8 are 
robust to (i) including of the number of press releases squared, cubed and logged as control 
variables to address the concern that our variables of interest are capturing a non-linear relation 
between disclosure frequency and market outcomes, (ii) scaling our smoothing variables by the 
number of press releases to further address the concern that these measures are mechanically 
associated with the number of releases,  (iii) using alternative intervals of 1 and 2 days in the 
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construction of our Short-Interval Smoothing variable, and (iv) deleting the first quarter a firm 
appears in the sample as well when there is long gap between disclosures (longer than 30 days) to 
address the concern that long intervals are inflating our Variance Smoothing variable.   
5. Conclusion 
There has been an increasing concern among regulators, practitioners and academics that 
investors are overloaded by frequent, abundant and often concurrent information, resulting in poor 
decision making and thus market frictions. This paper studies one way that managers can reduce 
the detrimental effects of information overload, which is by spreading out (i.e., de-clustering) their 
disclosures. By smoothing out disclosures, firms provide smaller amounts of information at any 
one point in time (as compared to providing multiple disclosures at one time), which allows 
investors to more fully assimilate each firm disclosure.  
We show that disclosure smoothing is higher when the conditions of the firm increase managers’ 
incentives to help investors fully understand firm disclosures. We also document various beneficial 
market outcomes associated with disclosure smoothing. More specifically, we show that disclosure 
smoothing is associated with increased liquidity, reduced stock price volatility, and increased 
analyst forecast accuracy. Our results are robust to numerous controls, an entropy balancing 
specification with year and industry fixed effects, number of press releases fixed-effects as well as 
a changes specification across two variables of interest.  
Our findings suggest that managers are aware of the detrimental effects of information overload 
and manage the timing of their disclosures in order to help investors fully assimilate firm 
disclosures. These findings contribute to prior literature documenting various detrimental effects 
34 
 
of information overload and to the current debate among practitioners and regulators about 
possible ways to improve disclosure efficiency and reduce the problem of information overload.  
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Appendix 1 – Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition 
Analyst Forecast 
Accuracy 
= Minus one times the absolute difference between the median quarterly analyst EPS 
forecast consensus and the actual, according to I/B/E/S, scaled by the stock price at the end 
of the quarter. We require the issuance of quarterly EPS forecasts by at least two unique 
analysts within 90 days prior to the earnings reporting date in order to calculate analyst 
forecast accuracy. 
Average Price = Average daily stock price during the quarter according to CRSP. 
Average Bid-Ask 
Spread 
= Average of the daily ask minus the daily bid quotes during the quarter according to 
CRSP. 
Cumulative Press 
Release Returns 
= Sum of the market-adjusted firm stock returns on the days of press release disclosures 
during the quarter. 
Earnings Volatility  = Standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items in the same fiscal quarter in 
the 5 prior years scaled by average total assets. 
Length of Press 
Releases 
= Log of sum of the number of characters in the disclosures made by the firm over the 
quarter. 
Leverage = Total debt divided by total assets in the quarter. 
Liquidity = Minus one times the Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure during the quarter, calculated 
as the average of the absolute value of the daily return-to-volume ratio. 
Log Assets  = Log of total assets in the current fiscal quarter. 
Loss = Indicator variable equal to one if the earnings before extraordinary items during the 
quarter is negative. 
Market-to-Book = Market value of equity divided by the book value at the end of the current quarter. 
Number of Analysts = Number of unique analysts issuing a forecast during the quarter according to I/B/E/S. 
Number of Press 
Releases  
= Number of firm-initiated press releases disclosed during the current quarter. Using 
RavenPack, we require articles to have a relevance score of at least 90, to have a source 
equal to DJN, and to be a 'Press Release' news type. We also delete duplicate Press 
Releases, by keeping only the highest Novelty score articles. For those with a Novelty 
score missing in RavenPack, we delete the articles disclosed within 15 minutes from the 
last Press Release. 
Prior 12-Month 
Returns 
= Cumulative monthly stock returns in the 12 months prior to the beginning of the current 
quarter. 
Proportion of Bad 
News Releases 
= Number of firm-initiated press releases with negative sentiment (according to 
RavenPacks' composite sentiment measure) divided by the total number of firm-initiated 
press releases in the quarter. 
ROA = Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets in the current fiscal quarter. 
Segments  = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported more than one business or geographic 
segment in the year according to Compustat Segments database 
Short-Interval 
Smoothing 
= Minus one times the number of firm-initiated press releases disclosed less than 3 days 
apart. 
Stock Return Volatility = Standard deviation of daily stock returns during the quarter. 
Turnover = Sum of the daily share volume divided by total shares outstanding in the quarter. 
Variance Smoothing = Minus one times the standard deviation of the number of hours between firm-initiated 
press releases disclosed during the quarter divided by 100. 
Volatility Prior 12-
Month Returns 
= Standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 12 months prior to the beginning of the 
current quarter. 
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Figure 1 - Examples of Smoothing 
 
This figure provides three examples of disclosure smoothing. All three examples contain the same number of press releases in the quarter (7, the sample mean). 
Under each X, which represents a disclosure, there is a number that indicates the number of days since the last disclosure. Although we use number of hours between 
each disclosure in the paper to differentiate disclosures made within a 24 hour period, we report the number of days here for easier interpretation. The calculated 
values of our variables of interest, Short-Interval Smoothing and Variance Smoothing, are displayed to the right of each example.
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Table 1 - Sample Selection 
  Firm-quarters Firms 
Firms disclosing at least one firm-initiated press release between 
2000-2013 according to RavenPack  249,359 8,134 
Less: firm-quarters with less than two press releases (42,320) (756) 
Less: firm-quarters without the following data on Compustat and 
CRSP: total assets, shareholders equity, number of shares 
outstanding , daily stock returns, daily trading volume, daily bid 
and ask quotes, prior 12 month returns, prior 5 quarters earnings 
(36,275) (1,159) 
  Sample in Tables 5, 6, and 7 170,764  6,219  
Less: firm-quarters without at least two EPS quarterly analyst 
forecasts in I/B/E/S 
(39,548) (836) 
  Sample in Table 8 131,216  5,383  
8-K filings between 2000-2013 for which event and filing dates are 
available. Sample in Table 4. 869,591 15,789 
  
This table describes how the samples used in each empirical test were constructed.  
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
      
Variable Firm-quarters Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Short-Interval Smoothing 170,764 -2.110 -1.000 4.011 
Variance Smoothing 170,764 -4.573 -3.327 3.908 
Liquidity 170,764 -6.078 -0.029 31.318 
Turnover 170,764 2.117 1.476 2.130 
Average Bid-Ask Spread 170,764 0.081 0.036 0.133 
Stock Return Volatility 170,764 0.032 0.026 0.022 
Number of Press Releases 170,764 7.171 5.000 6.220 
Length of Press Releases 170,764 5.764 7.873 3.946 
Log of Assets 170,764 6.518 6.547 2.096 
Market-to-Book 170,764 2.716 1.867 3.885 
Earnings Volatility 170,764 0.026 0.010 0.044 
Leverage 170,764 0.220 0.168 0.219 
ROA 170,764 -0.009 0.005 0.324 
Proportion of Bad News Releases 170,764 0.064 0.000 0.122 
Cumulative Press Release Returns 170,764 0.013 0.005 0.105 
Loss 170,764 0.303 0.000 0.460 
Prior 12-Month Returns 170,764 0.185 0.061 0.752 
Volatility Prior 12-Month Returns 170,764 0.034 0.028 0.020 
Segments 170,764 0.637 1.000 0.481 
Number of Analysts Following 170,764 6.874 5.000 7.161 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy 131,216 -0.009 -0.002 0.025 
 
This table describes the number of firm-quarter observations, mean, median and standard deviations of variables used in empirical tests. 
See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 - Frequency of Disclosures by Topic  
 
Topic 
# 
of press 
releases 
% 
of non-
missing 
%  
of total 
%  
of Positive 
Sentiment 
%  
of Neutral 
Sentiment 
%  
of Negative 
Sentiment 
Earnings (announcements, guidance) 153,304 25.67% 12.03% 48.62% 46.77% 4.61% 
Products and Services (product releases, business contracts) 150,651 25.23% 11.82% 49.57% 45.64% 4.79% 
Labor Issues (executive appointments, resignations) 67,673 11.33% 5.31% 52.02% 44.25% 3.73% 
Investor Relations (conference calls, board meetings) 51,801 8.67% 4.06% 84.69% 15.02% 0.29% 
Dividends 47,203 7.90% 3.70% 93.66% 6.08% 0.26% 
Credit Ratings 31,917 5.34% 2.50% 29.81% 31.57% 38.62% 
Revenues 23,373 3.91% 1.83% 68.55% 25.24% 6.20% 
Mergers and Acquisitions 22,489 3.77% 1.76% 67.27% 29.95% 2.78% 
Equity Actions (public-offerings, buybacks, fundraisings) 16,601 2.78% 1.30% 33.44% 60.26% 6.30% 
Assets (facility open, upgrades, sales, relocations) 10,636 1.78% 0.83% 41.27% 47.58% 11.14% 
Partnerships 8,696 1.46% 0.68% 54.77% 43.07% 2.16% 
Credit (credit extensions, note sale) 5,677 0.95% 0.45% 30.84% 56.86% 12.30% 
Legal (settlement, legal issues) 4,113 0.69% 0.32% 39.07% 48.36% 12.57% 
Analyst Ratings 837 0.14% 0.07% 76.11% 20.31% 3.58% 
Corporate Responsibility (donations) 596 0.10% 0.05% 27.85% 60.23% 11.91% 
Marketing (campaign ads) 554 0.09% 0.04% 44.40% 46.39% 9.21% 
Indexes (index listings) 337 0.06% 0.03% 91.10% 8.90% 0.00% 
Stock Prices (stock gain and loss) 305 0.05% 0.02% 68.52% 21.31% 10.16% 
Regulatory 237 0.04% 0.02% 27.43% 50.21% 22.36% 
Other 217 0.04% 0.02% 50.69% 41.47% 7.83% 
Total non-missing 597,217 100.00% 46.85% 55.75% 38.32% 5.92% 
Total missing 627,161 0.00% 53.15% 42.18% 53.98% 8.50% 
Total 1,224,378 100.00% 100.00% 48.80% 46.34% 7.24% 
 
This table presents the frequency of press releases by topic including the percentage of non-missing, percentage of total and percentage of three sentiment indicators, 
positive, neutral and negative. 
 
Table 4 - Delays in 8-K Disclosures    
 
PANEL A: Distance between Event Date and 8-K Disclosure Date (in days)     
 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile Mean Std. Dev. 
8-Ks with unique Event Dates (Single 8-Ks)      
   1st (and only) 8-K 0 1 4 3.44 7.83 
8-Ks with common Event Dates (Multiple 8-Ks)      
   1st 8-K 0 0 1 2.21 6.79 
   2nd 8-K 0 3 6 8.05 15.11 
   3rd 8-K 1 4 8 12.44 19.77 
   4th 8-K 1 5 19 16.20 22.92 
 
This panel presents summary statistics of the distance (in days) between the event date and corresponding 8-K disclosure date for 8-Ks with unique 
and common event dates.  
 
 
 
PANEL B: Multiple Disclosures and the Delay in 8-k Filings  
Variables Distance between Event Date and 8-K Disclosure Date 
 
Full Sample  Lower 
Complexity 
Higher 
Complexity 
Number of firm 8-Ks per Event Date 1.4369*** 1.3004***  0.9504*** 1.4784*** 
  (11.1229) (10.3788)  (5.7944) (9.6952) 
Fixed Effects Firm-year Firm-quarter  Firm-quarter Firm-quarter 
Observations 869,591 869,591  433,987 435,604 
 
This panel presents the results of regressing the distance between the 8-K event date and disclosure date on the number of 8-Ks per event date, as 
described in Equation (1). Higher Complexity equals one when the Gunning Fog Readability Index, a grade-level readability measure, is above 
the sample median. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
 
 
 
PANEL C: Prior Disclosures and the Delay in 8-K filings   
Variables 
Distance between Event Date and  
8-K Disclosure Date 
Another disclosure made less than 3 days prior to  0.2028*** 0.3492*** 
 Event Date (6.7571) (9.7088) 
Fixed Effects Firm-year Firm-quarter 
Observations 869,591 869,591 
 
This panel presents the results of regressing the distance between the 8-K event date and disclosure date on an indicator variable for the presence 
of a previous disclosure made in the prior three days. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
Table 5 - Determinants of Disclosure Smoothing 
  Dependent Variable 
Variables Prediction Short-Interval Smoothing 
Variance 
Smoothing 
Information Quantity      
Length of Press Releases + 0.0481*** 0.1673*** 
    (16.8691) (32.0153) 
Information Environment     
Log of Assets + 0.0525*** 0.2069*** 
    (6.9409) (17.4661) 
Information Complexity     
Segments + 0.0898*** 0.1013** 
    (4.0768) (2.4826) 
Information Uncertainty     
Earnings Volatility + 1.8033*** 5.5469*** 
    (11.7640) (14.4645) 
Information Content     
Cumulative Press Release Returns + 0.4296*** 0.3934*** 
    (11.7729) (5.1796) 
Information Frequency     
Number Press Releases -/+ -0.6261*** 0.2152*** 
    (-87.7789) (38.5318) 
Fixed Effects   Industry, Year Industry, Year 
Observations   170,764 170,764 
R-squared   0.887 0.274 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (2), the determinants model of disclosure smoothing. The 
dependent variables, Short-Interval Smoothing and Variance Smoothing, are minus one times the number of firm-
initiated press releases disclosed less than 3 days apart and minus one times the standard deviation of the 
number of hours between firm-initiated press releases disclosed during the quarter divided by 100, respectively. 
Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 6 - Disclosure Smoothing and Stock Liquidity  
PANEL A: Short-Interval Smoothing          
Variables Pred. Liquidity  Turnover  Average Bid-Ask 
Short-Interval Smoothing +/+/- 0.2060*** 0.1850***  0.0470* 0.0080  -0.0016** -0.0008** 
    (5.9279) (3.3892)  (1.8403) (1.1522)  (-2.0796) (-2.5015) 
Number of Press Releases   0.1365***   0.0262   -0.0015***  
    (4.4755)   (1.1402)   (-2.6326)  
Length of Press Releases  0.0685*** 0.4981***  0.0517*** 0.0330***  -0.0015*** -0.0032*** 
  (2.7190) (9.9361)  (3.5075) (9.6417)  (-3.3403) (-11.5514) 
Log Assets   0.7729*** 2.3416***  -0.0117 0.0349***  -0.0026* -0.0042*** 
    (8.8281) (13.8196)  (-0.2362) (2.9189)  (-1.7211) (-4.0884) 
Number of Analysts   -0.0049 0.0279  0.1192*** 0.1214***  -0.0017*** -0.0045*** 
    (-0.3882) (1.0881)  (11.8367) (29.1761)  (-3.8088) (-13.8698) 
Segments   0.4907** 3.3520***  -0.0825 0.1556***  -0.0017 -0.0263*** 
    (2.0831) (8.0646)  (-0.5600) (4.9387)  (-0.4990) (-10.5958) 
Earnings Volatility   4.2377* 52.9938***  1.5413 1.5165***  0.0017 -0.1761*** 
    (1.8010) (13.0991)  (1.2482) (5.4750)  (0.0505) (-11.8061) 
Vol. Prior 12-Month Returns  -62.6927*** -333.0009***  55.9770*** 33.9168***  -0.8192*** -0.6615*** 
    (-6.3801) (-17.0590)  (12.7428) (34.1414)  (-3.6685) (-11.5922) 
Prop. Bad News Releases  -0.0279 -5.9272***  0.6089 0.3276***  0.0163* 0.0193*** 
    (-0.0354) (-4.2817)  (1.4827) (4.1015)  (1.6669) (2.8607) 
Cum. Press Release Returns  -2.0338** -1.2526  -0.5161 0.0504  0.0050 -0.0009 
    (-2.3281) (-1.2733)  (-1.2622) (0.7629)  (0.1976) (-0.3844) 
Market-to-Book   0.1285*** 0.4482***  0.0142 0.0177***  -0.0003 -0.0014*** 
    (7.5012) (15.2995)  (1.3714) (5.6207)  (-1.1705) (-7.4326) 
Leverage   -0.6185 -3.8301***  0.6445** 0.2952***  0.0024 -0.0168*** 
    (-1.2612) (-4.0537)  (2.4030) (3.9168)  (0.2790) (-3.4758) 
ROA   -0.0194 -0.4306  0.0423 0.0790**  0.0153 0.0009 
    (-0.0527) (-1.0806)  (0.2373) (2.0443)  (1.0241) (0.4840) 
Prior 12-Month Returns   0.6311*** 2.4354***  0.3929*** 0.3994***  0.0012 -0.0027*** 
    (6.5133) (19.9847)  (6.8491) (30.2370)  (0.6608) (-4.2546) 
Loss   0.2013 1.6578***  -0.0338 -0.0322  0.0083 -0.0090*** 
    (1.1706) (4.8511)  (-0.2568) (-1.2838)  (1.0986) (-5.2411) 
Average Price        0.0012*** 0.0020*** 
        (5.5083) (11.2811) 
Entropy Balanced   Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
Fixed Effects   Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
 
Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
 
Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
Observations   170,764 170,764  170,764 170,764  170,764 170,764 
R-squared   0.045 0.125  0.302 0.297  0.325 0.279 
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PANEL B: Variance Smoothing 
Variables Pred. Liquidity  Turnover  Average Bid-Ask 
Variance Smoothing +/+/- 0.2886*** 0.1679***  0.0491*** 0.0174***  -0.0043*** -0.0011*** 
    (7.0511) (3.8875)  (6.0919) (12.3870)  (-2.9486) (-4.3147) 
Number of Press Releases   -0.0936***   -0.0136*   0.0040*  
    (-3.7527)   (-1.6496)   (1.6850)  
Length of Press Releases  0.4536*** 0.4821***  0.0579*** 0.0313***  -0.0044*** -0.0031*** 
  (10.7522) (9.4452)  (9.5017) (9.0836)  (-6.9462) (-10.9617) 
Log Assets   2.5533*** 2.3270***  0.1229*** 0.0337***  -0.0066*** -0.0041*** 
    (16.0386) (13.7693)  (6.1277) (2.8171)  (-4.0781) (-4.0181) 
Number of Analysts   -0.1427*** 0.0243  0.0941*** 0.1210***  -0.0057*** -0.0045*** 
    (-5.7821) (0.9420)  (9.9685) (29.0908)  (-2.7462) (-13.7884) 
Segments   1.1514*** 3.3567***  0.0485 0.1561***  -0.0171*** -0.0263*** 
    (3.3303) (8.0763)  (1.0940) (4.9561)  (-3.4983) (-10.6062) 
Earnings Volatility   27.9028*** 52.4765***  1.6602*** 1.4622***  -0.0866 -0.1728*** 
    (9.1308) (12.9067)  (2.9975) (5.2673)  (-1.6402) (-11.5312) 
Vol. Prior 12-Month Returns  -197.8365*** -332.9064***  44.9680*** 33.9250***  -1.3930** -0.6623*** 
    (-12.6189) (-17.0577)  (16.3600) (34.1696)  (-2.5149) (-11.6105) 
Prop. Bad News Releases  0.1568 -5.9253***  0.5906*** 0.3295***  -0.0494* 0.0193*** 
    (0.1083) (-4.2795)  (4.4167) (4.1293)  (-1.7536) (2.8457) 
Cum. Press Release Returns  -0.7714 -1.2259  -0.3046 0.0529  0.0585 -0.0011 
    (-0.7098) (-1.2466)  (-0.5734) (0.8009)  (0.8920) (-0.4486) 
Market-to-Book   0.2881*** 0.4446***  0.0265*** 0.0173***  -0.0017** -0.0014*** 
    (12.0454) (15.1882)  (3.2699) (5.5051)  (-2.2380) (-7.3412) 
Leverage   -1.2840* -3.8390***  0.5743*** 0.2951***  0.0138 -0.0168*** 
    (-1.9366) (-4.0649)  (4.7338) (3.9165)  (0.6674) (-3.4742) 
ROA   0.1017 -0.4331  0.0891** 0.0788**  0.0053 0.0009 
    (0.2857) (-1.0777)  (1.9714) (2.0559)  (1.5375) (0.4847) 
Prior 12-Month Returns   1.3266*** 2.4561***  0.3121*** 0.4014***  -0.0205* -0.0028*** 
    (10.9311) (20.1168)  (5.4550) (30.3973)  (-1.9243) (-4.4445) 
Loss   0.9024*** 1.6544***  -0.1282 -0.0325  -0.0148 -0.0089*** 
    (2.9593) (4.8382)  (-1.3434) (-1.2975)  (-1.0701) (-5.2332) 
Average Price        0.0019*** 0.0020*** 
        (3.2834) (11.2874) 
Entropy Balanced   Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
Fixed Effects   Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
 
Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
 
Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
Observations   170,764 170,764 
 
170,764 170,764 
 
170,764 170,764 
R-squared   0.084 0.125  0.264 0.298  0.403 0.279 
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This table presents the results of estimating Equation (3). Liquidity is calculated as minus one times the Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure during the quarter, calculated as the average 
of the absolute value of the daily return-to-volume ratio. Turnover is the sum of the daily share volume divided by total shares outstanding in the quarter. Average Big-Ask Spread is the 
average of the daily ask minus the daily bid quotes during the quarter according to CRSP. The variables of interest, Short-Interval Smoothing and Variance Smoothing, are minus one times 
the number of firm-initiated press releases disclosed less than 3 days apart and minus one times the standard deviation of the number of hours between firm-initiated press releases 
disclosed during the quarter divided by 100, respectively. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors clustered are by firm. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  
Table 7 - Disclosure Smoothing and Stock Return Volatility 
PANEL A: Short-Interval Smoothing  
Variables Prediction Stock Volatility 
Short-Interval Smoothing - -0.0003* -0.0001** 
    (-1.7728) (-2.3101) 
Number of Press Releases   -0.0006**  
    (-2.1979)  
Length of Press Releases  0.0040* 0.0012*** 
  (1.7577) (8.1618) 
Log Assets   -0.0006** -0.0013*** 
    (-2.5017) (-32.2625) 
Number of Analysts   0.0001 0.0001*** 
    (0.8822) (8.6040) 
Segments   0.0012* -0.0007*** 
    (1.7397) (-8.7868) 
Earnings Volatility   -0.0004 0.0030*** 
    (-0.0441) (2.7061) 
Volatility Prior 12-Month Returns   0.6744*** 0.6351*** 
    (17.6451) (132.0325) 
Proportion of Bad News Releases   0.0056 0.0058*** 
    (1.6341) (15.3473) 
Cumulative Press Release Returns   0.0047 0.0098*** 
    (1.5598) (16.6906) 
Market-to-Book   -0.0002** -0.0002*** 
    (-2.2839) (-16.2654) 
Leverage   0.0036*** 0.0037*** 
    (2.7553) (15.3934) 
ROA   -0.0021 -0.0010 
    (-1.2584) (-1.6067) 
Prior 12-Month Returns   0.0006 -0.0007*** 
    (0.9633) (-9.3166) 
Loss   0.0052*** 0.0045*** 
    (4.8973) (36.8165) 
Entropy Balanced   Yes No 
Fixed Effects   Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
Observations   170,764 170,764 
R-squared   0.580 0.597 
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PANEL B: Variance Smoothing 
Variables Prediction Stock Volatility 
Variance Smoothing - -0.0003*** -0.0001*** 
    (-6.0340) (-11.2395) 
Number of Press Releases   0.0001  
    (1.1218)  
Length of Press Releases  0.0013*** 0.0012*** 
  (3.0652) (8.3818) 
Log Assets   -0.0014*** -0.0013*** 
    (-14.5356) (-32.0066) 
Number of Analysts   0.0001** 0.0001*** 
    (2.1967) (9.0467) 
Segments   -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
    (-4.5303) (-8.8236) 
Earnings Volatility   0.0034 0.0034*** 
    (1.3606) (3.0920) 
Volatility Prior 12-Month Returns   0.6322*** 0.6350*** 
    (51.9007) (132.1768) 
Proportion of Bad News Releases   0.0052*** 0.0058*** 
    (3.9973) (15.3170) 
Cumulative Press Release Returns   0.0034 0.0098*** 
    (0.8917) (16.6558) 
Market-to-Book   -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 
    (-4.0290) (-16.0791) 
Leverage   0.0023*** 0.0037*** 
    (3.6839) (15.4695) 
ROA   -0.0014* -0.0009 
    (-1.9520) (-1.6134) 
Prior 12-Month Returns   0.0001 -0.0007*** 
    (0.4262) (-9.5381) 
Loss   0.0056*** 0.0045*** 
    (6.2144) (36.8846) 
Entropy Balanced   Yes No 
Fixed Effects   Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
Observations   170,764 170,764 
R-squared   0.592 0.598 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (4). The dependent variable, Stock Volatility, is the standard deviation of stock 
returns during the quarter. The variables of interest, Short-Interval Smoothing and Variance Smoothing, are minus one times the number 
of firm-initiated press releases disclosed less than 3 days apart and minus one times the standard deviation of the number of hours 
between firm-initiated press releases disclosed during the quarter divided by 100, respectively. Other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent 
signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  
52 
 
Table 8 - Disclosure Smoothing and Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
PANEL A: Short-Interval Smoothing 
Variables Prediction Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
Short-Interval Smoothing + 0.0003* 0.0002*** 
    (1.9337) (2.7078) 
Number of Press Releases   0.0003*  
    (1.8955)  
Length of Press Releases  -0.0015 0.0007** 
  (-1.4901) (2.0184) 
Log Assets   -0.0009*** -0.0017*** 
    (-3.5320) (-11.0569) 
Number of Analysts   0.0003*** 0.0005*** 
    (7.4027) (19.8234) 
Segments   0.0012 0.0020*** 
    (1.4004) (7.4767) 
Earnings Volatility   0.0015 -0.0044 
    (0.1375) (-1.3183) 
Volatility Prior 12-Month Returns   -0.4085*** -0.5337*** 
    (-11.8822) (-28.0003) 
Proportion of Bad News Releases   -0.0100*** -0.0087*** 
    (-2.7476) (-7.7554) 
Cumulative Press Release Returns   0.0005 -0.0025** 
    (0.1282) (-2.2058) 
Market-to-Book   0.0004*** 0.0003*** 
    (3.7743) (10.3641) 
Leverage   -0.0104*** -0.0082*** 
    (-3.4748) (-9.7580) 
ROA   0.0085 0.0080*** 
    (1.0367) (3.6459) 
Prior 12-Month Returns   0.0016*** 0.0033*** 
    (3.2281) (28.5730) 
Loss   -0.0065*** -0.0063*** 
    (-5.5539) (-20.3935) 
Entropy Balanced   Yes No 
Fixed Effects   Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
Observations   131,216 131,216 
R-squared   0.216 0.216 
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PANEL B: Variance Smoothing 
Variables Prediction Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
Variance Smoothing + 0.0001* 0.0001*** 
    (1.8596) (4.9035) 
Number of Press Releases   -0.0001***  
    (-2.6360)  
Length of Press Releases  0.0000 0.0000 
  (1.0483) (0.2122) 
Log Assets   -0.0014*** -0.0017*** 
    (-7.3988) (-11.2076) 
Number of Analysts   0.0004*** 0.0005*** 
    (10.8949) (19.7983) 
Segments   0.0010** 0.0020*** 
    (2.5526) (7.4078) 
Earnings Volatility   -0.0007 -0.0047 
    (-0.1453) (-1.4109) 
Volatility Prior 12-Month Returns   -0.5559*** -0.5326*** 
    (-20.1282) (-27.9525) 
Proportion of Bad News Releases   -0.0089*** -0.0087*** 
    (-7.0968) (-7.7277) 
Cumulative Press Release Returns   -0.0044** -0.0024** 
    (-2.1429) (-2.1726) 
Market-to-Book   0.0002*** 0.0003*** 
    (5.7686) (10.3072) 
Leverage   -0.0066*** -0.0082*** 
    (-6.1626) (-9.8088) 
ROA   0.0074*** 0.0079*** 
    (3.1152) (3.5687) 
Prior 12-Month Returns   0.0031*** 0.0033*** 
    (13.5955) (28.6959) 
Loss   -0.0065*** -0.0063*** 
    (-14.0649) (-20.3159) 
Entropy Balanced   Yes No 
Fixed Effects   Industry, Year # of PRs, Year 
Observations   131,216 131,216 
R-squared   0.225 0.217 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (4). Analyst Forecast Accuracy is minus one times the absolute difference between the 
median quarterly analyst EPS forecast consensus and the actual, according to I/B/E/S, scaled by the stock price at the end of the quarter. 
We require the issuance of quarterly EPS forecasts by at least two unique analysts within 90 days prior to the earnings reporting date in 
order to calculate analyst forecast accuracy. The variables of interest, Short-Interval Smoothing and Variance Smoothing, are minus one times 
the number of firm-initiated press releases disclosed less than 3 days apart and minus one times the standard deviation of the number of 
hours between firm-initiated press releases disclosed during the quarter divided by 100, respectively. Other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent 
signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Table 9 – Changes Specifications 
PANEL A: Changes in Short-Interval Smoothing 
Variables Predictions Change Liquidity 
Change 
Turnover 
Change 
Average 
Bid-Ask 
Change 
Stock 
Volatility 
Change 
Analyst 
Accuracy 
Change Short-Interval 
Smoothing 
+/+/-/-/+ 0.0590*** 0.0088*** -0.0004*** -0.0000 0.0003* 
 (3.0095) (4.3822) (-4.6674) (-0.7166) (1.6698) 
Change controls same as:  Table 6 Table 6 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 
Observations  153,058 153,058 153,058 153,058 98,619 
R-squared  0.006 0.032 0.016 0.089 0.007 
  
 
PANEL B: Changes in Variance Smoothing 
Variables Predictions Change Liquidity 
Change 
Turnover 
Change 
Average 
Bid-Ask 
Change 
Stock 
Volatility 
Change 
Analyst 
Accuracy 
Change Variance Smoothing +/+/-/-/+ 0.0902*** 0.0009 -0.0003*** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
   (3.8685) (1.0351) (-5.4830) (-6.2044) (3.8066) 
Change controls same as:  Table 6 Table 6 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 
Observations  153,058 153,058 153,058 153,058 98,619 
R-squared  0.006 0.032 0.014 0.095 0.013 
 
 
This table replicates the results in Tables 6, 7 and 8 using changes specifications. The variables of interest, Short-Interval Smoothing and 
Variance Smoothing, are minus one times the number of firm-initiated press releases disclosed less than 3 days apart and minus one 
times the standard deviation of the number of hours between firm-initiated press releases disclosed during the quarter divided by 
100, respectively. Other variables are changes versions of variables defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 10 - Bundling of Positive and Negative News 
PANEL A: Conditional Logit Regression on the Likelihood of Disclosing Good News After Bad News 
Variables Next PR is Positive 
Current PR is Negative 0.0660*** 0.2715*** 
  (7.0049) (27.0912) 
Fixed Effects Firm-year Firm-year-quarter 
Observations 1,222,824 1,096,789 
  
 
PANEL B: Number of Days Until Next Good News Disclosure 
Variables Number of Days Until Next Positive PR 
Current PR is Negative -0.4021*** -0.3905*** 
  (-2.8719) (-2.6464) 
Fixed Effects Firm-year Firm-year-quarter 
Observations 589,718 589,718 
 
 
PANEL C: Delay in 8-K filings of Next Disclosure 
Variables Distance between Event Date and 8-K Disclosure Date of the Next PR 
Current PR is Negative × Next PR is Positive -1.4304* 
  (-1.6812) 
Current PR is Negative 1.4429*** 
 (2.7205) 
Next PR is Positive -0.1385 
 (-0.7303) 
Fixed Effects Firm-year 
Observations 234,972 
 
 
This table models the provision of positive news (Panel A), the number of days until the next positive news (Panel B), or the distance 
between 8-K event and disclosure dates (Panel C) as a function of recent negative news as described in Equation (5). Current PR is 
Negative is an indicator variable set equal to one if the current press release is negative in tone as captured by RavenPack. Next PR is 
Positive is an indicator variable set equal to one if the subsequent press release is positive in tone as captured by RavenPack. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
